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Abstract
The paper develops a model of academic tenure based on multi-tasking
and screening. A professor has two tasks, researching and teaching. We
assume that researching performance is easy to measure but teaching per-
formance is immeasurable. Then Holmtrom and Milgroms (1991) classical
muli-task principal-agent model implies that the only way for the the uni-
versity to incentivizeteaching activity is decreasing the incentive power
to researching activity. This justies the low-powered contract to tenured
professors. However, with low-powered contract, the university will face
serious informational problem in the process of enrollment, either trans-
ferring rents to the candidates with low ability if the wage level is high,
or su¤ering from the potential occupational vacancy if the wage level is
low. To this dilemma, the up-or-out contract is a possible solution.
Key Words: Multi-tasking, Screening, Academic Tenure, Up-or-Out Con-
tract
JEL Classications: D86, J41, J44, M55
1 Introduction
Compared to other organizations, modern universities are characteristic of its
tenure system, under which the tenured professors usually earn performance-
independent wage, and can not be red unless they have serious moral problems.
It is quite strange given that economics emphasizes the fundamental role of
incentive for e¢ ciency. The way that the tenure position is granted is also
varied. Usually, a well-established senior scholar is o¤ered a tenure position
directly while a junior with uncertain academic prospect has to experience a
probationary period, by the end of which he will obtain tenure position if he
has met a predetermined academic criterion and will be red otherwise.
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Academic tenure system since its advent has always been controversy and
under heated debate. Advocates consider it to be extremely necessary for pro-
tecting academic freedom and original innovations, as articulated in "1915 Dec-
laration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure" by American
Association of University Professors (AAUP). However, opponents contend that
tenure system, depriving the universities of the right to re their employees, has
spawned plenty of "lazy professors" with low academic productivity or some ec-
centric professors who only care about own academic interests while overlooking
the important practical needs. Because scal patronage is the important nan-
cial sources for the universities (even the private ones), tenure system should be
abolished to save public resource waste.
Despite the strong oppositions, one stunning phenomenon is that many uni-
versities whether public or private have adopted the tenure system "voluntarily".
Since the private universities, in principle, have the right to reject it, simple re-
vealed preference argument show that the universities are the very beneciary
from this system. Any institution, once established, will evolve in its inher-
ent logic which may be quite di¤erent from it its historical origin. So, besides
protecting academic freedom, are there other rationales for tenure system?
Freeman (1977) o¤ers a risk-sharing explanation. He emphasizes the poten-
tial tension between the facts that researching activities are in essence highly
risky on the one hand and that the researchers are usually risk-averse on the
other hand. In his opinion, the combination of tenure system and minimum
wage policy is a risk-sharing mechanism encouraging risk-averse researcher to
do the risky but socially benecial research projects. Furthermore, Mcpher-
son and Whinston (1999) argue that scientic progress necessitates knowledge
specialization with which, however, the researchers risk being stranded. For ex-
ample, a researcher highly specialized in one frontier eld might not be rightly
understood and evaluated by other colleagues, especially in short term. This
implies that, without enough occupational protection, risk-averse researcher will
have insu¢ cient incentive to specialize, which in turn retards scientic progress.
Plausible as an explanation to tenure system, the risk-sharing argument begs
the question why one rarely observes all life employment (as counterpart of
tenure system in universities) in industries where technological progress is also
characteristic of risk and specialization. Maybe, law bar is a special case.
Siow (1998) argues that tenure system may help improve the social e¢ ciency
of a researcher allocating his time on teaching and research in life cycle. Teaching
productivity is assume to be irrelevant to age while research productivity has an
inverse-U-shaped relationship in age, rst increasing, then peaking and nally
decreasing. Under this assumption, a professor should spend more time on
teaching as his age increases. However, insofar as only academic publications
can be observed by other universities as potential competing employers, the
professors will exert excessive e¤ort on research in order to have a better outside
option as a credible threat to quit in the bargaining process with his current
employer for a better compensation. Siow suggests that tenure system helps
alleviate the ine¢ ciency. The reason is as follows: Only when a professor has
well accomplished the tasks, will the current employer have incentive to match
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the outside bid increasing the compensation for the professor. In our opinion,
this explanation faces a problem of credibility. The fact that the professor has
well accomplished the tasks in the past does not imply it is still the case in the
future.
Carmichael (1988) understands the university as an internal labor market
whose e¢ ciency may be plagued by asymmetric information. Given an exoge-
nous budget constraint, the university always wants to select the most com-
petent employees. Thanks to knowledge specialization, the university has to
delegate the enrollment tasks to the incumbent professors who have more ex-
pertise for estimating the academic prospect of the candidates. However, with-
out occupational protection, the incumbents will be inclined to enroll those less
competent than themselves to minimize the potential threat to their position.
In this vein, Carmichael argues that the main function of academic tenure is
supply the incumbent professor with "right" incentive to enroll new employees
by o¤ering full occupational protection to them. Quite plausible as it seems,
this story is still not enough to justify academic tenure. Indeed, if the main
motivation of introducing tenure system is to correct incumbents enrollment
incentive, why will the universities not peg the new employeesperformance to
the incumbentscompensation?
The above literature only analyze the not-re-employee feature of tenure
system, but omit its up-or-out feature. However, in practice an assistant pro-
fessor often faces an up-or-out contract under which he will be red if he can
not full the predetermined academic criteria by the end of the probational pe-
riod. Kahn and Huberman (1988) justies the "up-or-out" contract when the
employer-employee relationship is characteristic of double moral hazard. Con-
sider a simple two-period model. In the rst period, the employee determines
whether to make a costly investment to accumulate specic human capital. If
he does invest, he is more likely to have a high productivity in the second pe-
riod in the sense of rst-order stochastic dominance. Here double moral hazard
means that only the employee knows whether he has made the investment pe-
riod while only the employer observes the employees productivity in the second
period (say, due to team work). To be meaningful, the investment is socially
desirable. However, since in the second period the realization of the employees
productivity can be either high or low, the employer will always have incentive
to claim low productivity and pay low wage if the employee can not be red
for low productivity. With rational expectation, the employee will have no in-
centive to invest in the rst period. This is an ine¢ cient outcome. However,
if the employee can be red in the second period, the employer will be able to
make a credible commitment that any employee, if not red, should be paid high
wage. Clearly, the employees with realized high productivity will be retained.
In this scenario, the employees are also willing to make investment in the rst
period. Although Kahn and Huberman emphasized human capital specicity,
Waldman (1990) shows that their insight are quite general, still holding as long
as the incumbent employer can observe the employees productivity earlier than
potential employers, i.e., when there is a time lag for informational di¤usion.
Since human capital in higher education is highly general, Waldmans (1990)
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model actually provides an important rationale of tenure system with up-or-out
contract. However, since the key to the double moral hazard story is that the
university can re the employees with low productivity, one may wonder why the
universities will totally give up the option to re the tenured professors, which
may be very costly when there is productivity uctuation of the professors doing
research in the future.
Although the existing literature has shed light on tenure system from di¤er-
ent perspectives, there are still some open problems. As suggested above, either
they neglect to discuss the up-or-out dimension of tenure system, or they fail to
explain why the universities will voluntarily give up the right to re its employ-
ees in an once-for-all way. Having these in mind, this paper tries to propose a
novel rationale to academic tenure system, highlighting that it might be impor-
tant for the universities to solve the interwoven problems of multi-task incentive
and ability screening in the process of enrollment. More concretely, we put two
questions: Firstly, why would the universities like to adopt a tenure system
voluntarily? and secondly, conditional on that the universities will have tenure
system, what is the best way for them to o¤er tenure position to candidates
whose ability is private information?
Our answer to the rst problem is a direct application of Holmstrom and
Milgroms (1991) classic analysis on multi-task incentive. The university is a
locale for knowledge production and dissemination. Consequentially, professors
have two main tasks, teaching and research, both of which should be incen-
tivized. Given there are many academic journals publicly available and ranking
di¤erently, designing a performance-dependent incentive contract for research-
ing activity seems quite simple. Say, the university can just count how many
articles one teacher has published, while putting feasible weights on journal
rankings and impact factors.
By contrast, it is very di¢ cult to estimate a professors teaching performance.
One di¢ culty arises from the inherent double moral hazard problem in the
process of knowledge dissemination in which "teaching" performance depends
not only on the teaching e¤ort at the teachersside but also on the absorbing
e¤ort at the studentsside (Dewatripont and Tirole, 2005). Even when a bad
teaching performance is observed, it is not clear which party, either the teacher
or the students, is to blame. Another di¢ culty comes from the fact that teachers
in universities are often self-estimated. This implies that student score is not
a good proxy for teaching performance. If ever used, it must lead to score
"ination". 1 Finally, we should emphasize that, the teaching service obtained
as a package by the students in universities is, in essence, like a public good
supplied by several individual teachers. Therefore, it is not easy to attribute
good or bad performance to one specic teacher. This is especially true if we take
into consideration the long time for full revelation of the reaching performance.
To simplify, we assumes that research performance is measurable while teach-
ing performance is not. Since any implementable contract should be made on
1However, in practice, enrollment rate is often used estimating the teaching performance
of the teachers in primary or high schools, for these teachers usually can not control the
enrollment rate in concours.
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some observable and veriable signals, this arouses truly serious problems for
universities to incentive teaching and research at the same time. Typically, a
high-powered incentive contract on observable academic performance must be at
the expense of teaching incentive, which might not accord to the interest of the
universities. Thus, according to Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), the only way
to "incentivize" teaching activity is to decrease the incentive power to research-
ing activity. In our opinion, this explains why professors often have xed wages
largely independent on their after-tenure academic performance. Furthermore,
the tenured professors should not be red even when their after-tenure acad-
emic performance is unsatisfactory. Otherwise, the xed-wage compensation
together with conditional ring is actually a high-powered incentive mechanism
rather than a low-powered one. Or in Lazears (2000) terminology, it is a dis-
continuous incentive mechanism. As it is clear now, giving up the option to re
tenured professors can be understood as a credible commitment from the uni-
versity to "incentivize" teaching activities whose performance is hard to observe
and estimate.
Based on our justication of tenure system, the paper is focused on how the
university should o¤er tenure contract when the productivity or ability of the
candidates are their private information. More concretely, should the university
directly o¤er a tenure contract to the candidates with a xed wage, or should
it o¤ers an up-or-out contract with a probational period and predetermined
academic criterion?
From the viewpoint of multi-tasking incentive, the university should o¤er
tenure position directly to professors such that they will have "right" incentive
for teaching activity. However, this kind of direct tenure contract confronts se-
rious adverse selection. Given candidates with high ability have better outside
option and occupational positions in university are scare, direct tenure contract
leads to a dilemma for the university between rent extraction and e¢ ciency. By
o¤ering a direct tenure contract with high wage satisfying the high-ability can-
didatesparticipation constraint, the university will transfer information rents
to the low-ability candidates. By o¤ering a direct tenure contract with low wage
just satisfying the low-ability candidatesparticipation constraint, the university
will su¤er from occupational vacancy.
The main point of this paper is that, when multi-tasking incentive is min-
gled with ability screening in the process of enrollment, an up-or-out tenure
contract is a potential way out for the university. Only if a candidate meets
the predetermined academic criterion in probational period, can he be granted
tenured position. If there is a monotonicity relationship between ability and
academic performance, this contract will have the e¤ect of screening the can-
didates. Meanwhile, the tenured professors have "right" incentive for teaching
activity since they get xed-wage compensation and can not red in case of bad
academic performance.
Section II is the basic model, in which research performance can be perfectly
measured. Since a candidates ability is either high or low, we consider three
scenarios of employment: the rst is direct tenure contract with low wage, the
second is direct contract with high wage, the third is up-or-out contract with
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a probational period and a predetermined academic criteria for promotion. By
comparison between these three scenarios, we obtain the best the employment
contract. We also do comparative static analysis. When academic performance
can be perfectly measured, the optimal up-or-out contract may lead to rst-
best allocation if the ability di¤erence between candidates is small. Although,
in this case, the optimal up-or-out contract always dominates the low-wage
direct tenure contract, it results in distortion and will be dominated by high-
wage direct tenure contract when the ability di¤erence is very large and the
candidate is most likely to have high ability. Finally, as we shall show in the
extended model in section III, the up-or-out contract will be dominated by a
low-wage direct tenure contract when the academic performance can not be
perfectly measured and the candidate is most likely to have low ability. Section
IV concludes.
2 Basic Model
2.1 Model Setting
Consider a representative university. For expositional convenience, one employee
of the university is simply called a "teacher" when it is unclear whether he has
obtained tenure position. A potential employee is called a candidate. A teacher
who has obtained tenure position is called a tenured professor. A teacher who
has not obtained tenure position is called an assistant professor.
Every teacher has two tasks, i.e., research (task 1) and teaching (task 2).
Both the university and the candidates are long-lived, risk neutral. They aim
to maximize respective prots. Time is discrete with discount factor  < 1:
Following Siow (1998), the vacant position in the university are scare. Without
loss of generality, there is only one vacant position left for candidates. Each
period enters only one candidate, having either high ability () or low-ability
(), with probability v and 1   v respectively. The candidate knows exactly
his type, but the university only knows v: Any time, if one candidate is not
employed or has been red by the university, he exits forever, thereafter working
in a competitive market with net payment    c; where  and c > 1 can be
understood as the corresponding output and cost.
Consider the contract for a candidate : If he exerts e¤ort xi on task i
(= 1; 2), his output in task i is
qi = xi: (1)
This assumption has two implications. On the one hand, for a specic teacher,
the marginal contribution of teaching and researching e¤ort is the same; on the
other hand, with same e¤ort, a teacher with higher ability will have a larger
contribution. However, as argued before, only academic performance q1 = x1
can be observed and used for contract design. As a convention, when one
variable has upper bar (or lower bar), it is related to type  (or ):
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It is important how to characterize the multi-task cost. Teaching and re-
searching may be complementary. For example, the fruits of research can be
used as teaching materials, hence decreasing the preparation cost of teaching.
On the contrary, as an interaction between teachers and students, teaching activ-
ity may help teachers to nd excellent research assistants, and hence decreasing
the researching cost. However, teaching and research can also be substitutes.
Besides direct crowding-out e¤ect of time, frequent transformation between dif-
ferent tasks may incur some extra cost. No matter teaching or research, it may
need continuous attention or meditation. Stopping on half way often entails
duplication cost. To synthesize both possibilities, we assume that, if a teacher
exerts e¤ort xi on task i; then his multi-task cost is
C(x1; x2) = x
2
1 + x1x2 + x
2
1 (2)
where  2 [ 2; 2] characterizes the relationship between teaching and research-
ing. They are complementary if  < 0 but substitutes if  > 0:
In this paper, our focus is not on the overall e¤ort of a teacher. Instead,
by assuming that a teachers overall time (e¤ort) is xed, we want to see how
a teacher will allocate his xed time across teaching and researching activities
under di¤erent employment contract. Without loss of generality, we normalize
the overall time to 1:
x1 + x2 = 1: (3)
Substituting (3) into (2), the multi-task cost becomes:
C(x) = 1  (2  )x+ (2  )x2; (4)
where we dene x  x1 for national convenience.
From (4), C 0(x)<>0 when x
<
>1=2: That is, C(x) is a parabola curve opening
upwards. Dene
Cm =
1
2
+

4
= min
x
C(x) (5)
Clearly, with inelastic overall time assumption, we simplify the multi-task
problem to a single-task one. But is it meaningful to make this assumption?
We want to say that this assumption, in essence, is consistent with Holmstrom
and Milgrom (1991) in which the marginal e¤ort cost of the agent is assumed to
be negative when the e¤ort is below a threshold, and then increases when e¤ort
increases. The reason that they make this assumption is to guarantee that the
agent has incentive to exert some e¤ort under a xed-wage contract. So is true
for our paper.
Before going to market outcome, we rst consider the rst-best allocation.
Obviously, for each candidate, whether high- or low-ability, once employed by
the university, his contribution to social welfare, net opportunity cost, is
W () = c  C(x): (6)
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Noting C(x) < 1; the technical assumption c > 1 implies that there should be
no positional vacancy in the university since the social benet from the candidate
working in university is higher than in other competitive lines. Further noting
that C(x) is minimized when x = 1=2; a candidate, once employed by the
university, should spend equal time on teaching and researching activities.
Proposition 1 Under rst-best outcome, there should be positional vacancy
and the xed time should be equally allocated to teaching and researching.
2.2 Market Equilibrium
We want to discuss what is the best way for the university to o¤er tenure
contract. As told before, there are three possibilities, the low-wage direct tenure,
the high-wage direct tenure contract and the up-or-out tenure contract.
The timing is as follows: The university rst o¤ers one kind of tenure con-
tract which a candidate can accept or reject it. In case of acceptance, the teacher
chooses how to allocate the xed time across teaching and researching activities.
Then the contract is implemented. If the scare position is still vacant (maybe,
it is because the candidate reject the o¤er or because the university has just
red an unqualied assistant professor), then the game starts again in the next
period; otherwise, the game is over since all the position in the university have
been lled with tenured professors.
2.2.1 Direct Tenure Contract
Since a candidate may be low- or high-ability. There are two options for direct
tenure contract. If the university o¤ers the direct tenure contract with high
wage w such that
w =    c+ Cm; (7)
the high-ability candidate will accept it since (7) is just his participation con-
straint Of course,  will also be happy to accept this o¤er, with current rent  
in each period. As both both types will accept this contract, the vacant position
is lled since the rst period by tenured professors who, in turn, will choose the
time allocation plan that minimizes multi-task cost. After discounting, the total
benet of the university from this contract is
KI =
v + (1  v)   w
1   =
c  Cm
1    
(1  v)(   )w
1   : (8)
If the university o¤ers the direct tenure contract with low wage w such that
w =    c+ Cm; (9)
then only  will accept this o¤er and then chooses time allocation plan that
minimizes multi-task cost. Therefore, if the candidate is  (with probability
1   v); the vacant position will be lled afterwards. However, if the candidate
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is  (the probability is v), he will reject the o¤er and the position keeps vacant,
the game going to the next period. After discounting, the total benet of the
university from this contract is
KII = (1  v)   w
1   + vK
II =
(1  v)(c  Cm)
(1  v)(1  ) (10)
2.2.2 Up-or-Out Contract
With direct tenure contract, the university faces such a dilemma, either suf-
fering from possible positional vacancy when the wage is low or transferring
informational rents to low-ability candidate when the wage is high. An up-or-
out tenure contract may be a way out. We denote an up-or-out contract to be
a triple fwn; wt; Rg;where wn is the xed wage for assistant professor in pro-
bational period, wt is the xed wage for tenured professor all the life, and R is
the academic criterion for promotion. Sometimes, without confusion, we also
call the up-or-contract R: Depending on the type di¤erence, we consider the
up-or-out contract in the following cases.
   2
In this case, the type di¤erence is very big. Even when  chooses his cost-
minimizing time allocation x = 1=2 and  spends all his time on researching
activity, s academic performance () is still less than s (=2): With these
observations, the optimal up-or-out tenure contract can be easily characterized
by the following conditions:
R = =2 ( cannot imitate ) (11)
wn   Cm + (w
t Cm)
1    c1  (s ex ante participation constraint) (12)
wt   Cm     c (s interior participation constraint) (13)
wn =    c+ Cm (s participation constraint) (14)
Under this up-or-out tenure contract, the universitys net benet is
KIII = v

   wn + (   w
t)
1  

+ (1  v)    wn + KIII = c  Cm
1   (15)
Note that Kj (j = I; II; III) are all continuous in v: Note further that
@KI=@v > 0; @KII=@v < 0; @KIII=@v = 0; KIII = KI at v = 0; and KIII =
KII at v = 1: We get the following proposition.
9
Proposition 2 If  > 2; then the up-or-out contract always dominates the
direct tenure contracts, and leads to rst-best outcome.
This proposition shows that, if the candidates type di¤erence is very big,
then the up-or-out tenure contract characterized by (11) through (14) is the
best tenure contract for the university. It is quite intuitive. By (12) (with equal-
ity), the rent of high-ability candidate is zero; by (13), the rent of low-ability
candidate is also suppressed to zero. As a result, the up-or-out contract not
only extracts all the information rent of the low-ability candidate (compared to
high-wage direct tenure contract), but also avoids positional vacancy(compared
to low-wage direct tenure contract). Clearly, this up-or-out contract results in
e¤ort distortion as well.
  < 2
Now the type di¤erence is not so large as before. If the university still
sets academic criterion R = =2;  can meet this criterion if he distorts his
researching e¤ort upwards to R= < 1: If this does happen, there will be
no screening. On the contrary, if the university wants full screening, it can
simply set an academic criterion R =  which  will never succeed to full.
However, when academic criterion is R = ; s optimal e¤ort in probational
period should be =; larger than 1=2; the cost-minimizing (also the socially
optimal) e¤ort. We want to ask whether the university can nd an academic
criterion bR 2 (=2; ) that also fullls perfect screening with less distortion than
R = :
Suppose that the university has set a criterion bR 2 (=2; ); under which
promotion entails the research e¤ort bx = bR= for  and bx = bR= for  in the
probational period. Since bx > bx > 1=2, neither  nor  would like to choose
higher research e¤ort for promotion. Therefore, if some bR 2 (=2; ) can lead to
perfect screening, it must be the case that it is better for  to choose 1=2 thanbx: Based on above analysis, a separating equilibrium bR 2 (=2; ) (if any) can
be characterized by the following conditions:
wn   C(bx) + (wt Cm)1  =  c1  (s ex ante participation constraint) (16)
wt   Cm     c (s interior participation constraint) (17)
wn   C(bx) + (wt Cm)1  < wn   Cm + ( c)1  ( does not mimick  (18)
wn =    c+ Cm (s participation constraint) (19)
bR 2 (=2; ) or bx 2 (1=2; =) (bx = 1=2 can not be equilibrium) (20)
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For above conditions, only (20) needs further explanation. It means that
if the university sets the academic criterion R; then  will have incentive to
mimick. This condition is essential to welfare analysis and comparative statics
later. Indeed, if this condition is violated, the universitys benet under up-or-
out contract is still KIII ; hence always dominating the direct tenure contracts.
Using (16), (18) is equivalent to
wn >  +
(   )
1   + Cm   c+ C(
bx)  C(bx); (21)
which in turn implies that the key to equilibrium bR is: the right side of (19)
should be larger than the right side of (21). Using the fact that bx = bx = bR;
this requires
D(bx) = C 

bx  C bx >    
1   (22)
Substituting the concrete form of C(x) into (22) and taking equality, (22)
becomes
(2  )bxbx1 + 


  1

=

1   : (23)
Note that D
0
(:) > 0 because research e¤ort is now larger than 1=2 in proba-
tional period. Depending on parameters, there may arise two kinds of equilibria.
Case I: D(  ) >
 
1  or (2  )(1  ) > 
2

In this case, there exists a unique bx 2 (1=2; =) such (23) is satised. The
separating equilibrium characterized by (18) through (20) exists: bx is given by
(23), then bR = bx 2 (=2; ); and bx = bR=:  chooses research e¤ort bx in
probational period and then gets tenure position. Thereafter, he always chooses
x = 1=2.  chooses x = 1=2 in probational period but then gets red, going to
competitive industry. With a little algebraic calculation, under this up-or-out
tenure contract, the university gets expected prot
KIV = v(   wn) + (1  v)(   wn) + v (   w
t)
1   + (1  v)K
IV (24)
=
c  Cm
1    
v
h
C
bx  Cmi
1   + v
However, there are more intuitive way to get(24). Note that  does not
distort his e¤ort and neither type gets positive rent. Suppose for the moment
that  also does not distort his e¤ort. Then the universitys prot will be
c Cm
1  : Now what remains is to subtract
s distortion loss in probational period.
Noting that the distortion occurs in the next period only if the current assistant
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professor is ; the expected distortion loss is
L = v
h
C(bx)  Cmi+ (1  v)L = v
h
C(bx)  Cmi
1   + v : (25)
Case II: D(  ) <
 
1  or (2  )(1  ) < 
2

In this case, the equilibrium bR 2 (=2; ) characterized by (18) through (20)
does not exist. However, the university can simply set the academic criterioneR =  to implement perfect screening equilibrium. In this equilibrium,  chooses
research e¤ort ex = = in probational period, then gets tenure position and
chooses x = 1=2 forever.  chooses x = 1=2 in probational period but then get
red going to competitive industry. Like (24), in this equilibrium, the university
gets expected prot
KV =
c  Cm
1    
v
h
C(ex)  Cmi
1   + v (26)
Note that KV = KIV > KI at v = 0 , KV < KIV < KI at v = 1,
@KI=@v > 0; @KIV =@v < 0 and @KV =@v < 0: Then there must be a unique bv
such that KI ><K
IV if v><bv: There also exists a unique ev such that KI ><KV if
v><ev: Furthermore, because ex > bx > 1=2 and hence C(ex) > C(bx) > Cm; then
KV < KIV ; bv > ev: Figure (??) illustrates the universitys payo¤ when  < 2:
Figure 1: Comparison between up-or-out contract and direct tenure contracts
when academic performance can be perfectly measured.
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Proposition 3 When   2, the optimal up-or-out contract still dominates
low-wage direct tenure contract. However, if v is very large (v > bv in equilib-
rium bR 2 (=2; ); v > ev in equilibrium eR = ), then the optimal up-or-out
contract will be dominated by high-wage direct tenure contract. None of the
tenure contracts can realize rst-best outcome.
Everyday experience tells us that it is di¢ cult to distinguish two things
with tiny di¤erence. Or to tell the di¤erence between them is very costly.
Similarly, when the type di¤erence of the candidate is very small, the up-or-
out contract will inevitably result in e¢ ciency loss even it can still implement
perfect screening given academic performance is perfectly observed. When the
candidate is unlikely to be low ability type, the social value of screening is very
small, and hence the up-or-out contract will be dominated by the high-wage
direct tenure contract. The reason that the up-or-out contract still dominates
low-wage direct contract is that it does not lead to distortion but can suppress
informational rents when the candidate is low-ability type.
2.3 Comparative Statics
Now we consider the e¤ects of parameters  and  on the optimal contract
choice. According to model setting,  characterizes the multi-task cost. When
 is larger, teaching and research activities are more likely to be substitutes, or
the complementarity between them decreases. Furthermore, when  is bigger,
the future benet is more important, which in some sense represents a shorter
probational period.
Note that the equilibrium ev is determined by KI = KV , or
v(2  )( 

  12 )2
1   + v =
(1  v)(   )
1   : (27)
From this equation, the implicit function theorem immediately leads to the
following proposition.
Proposition 4 @ev=@ > 0; @ev=@ > 0
The results are very intuitive. In the equilibrium eR = ; ex = =; s research
e¤ort in probational period, depends neither on  nor on : So, ceteris paribus,
a bigger  implies that the university can screen the candidate in a shorter
time, which necessarily increases the attractiveness of up-or-out contract. Fur-
thermore, referring to (25) and (26), a larger  means that C
ex   Cm =
(2   )(ex   12 )2 is smaller. That is, compared to the high-wage direct tenure
contract, s e¤ort distortion in probational period is smaller, which necessarily
increases the attractiveness of up-or-out contract.
Relatively, the comparative statics of bv is a little more complicated. Like ev,bv is determined by KI = KIV ; or
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v(2  )(bx  12 )2
1   + v =
(1  v)(   )
1   : (28)
However, now bx is endogenously determined by (23). As a result, we must
combine (28) with (23) to see how the parameters a¤ect ev:
Proposition 5 @bv=@ < 0; @bv=@ < 0:
Proof. Together with (28) and (23), we dene an implicit function
bF = v(bx  12 )2
(1   + v) bxbx1 +   1  
(1  v)(   )

= 0; (29)
from which we immediately have d bFdv > 0; @ bF@ > 0; @ bF@ = 0; and @ bF@bx / bx   
1
2 > 0; where the last inequality uses the separating condition bx > 12 : From
(23), we have @bx@ > 0 and @bx@ > 0: Thus, we have d bFd = @ bF@ + @ bF@bx @bx@ > 0;
d bF
d =
@ bF
@ +
@ bF
@bx @bx@ = @ bF@bx @bx@ > 0: Based on above analysis, the implicit function
theorem immediately implies that @bx@ > 0 and @bv@ < 0:
Surprisingly, the results of proposition 5 are completely opposite to those
in proposition 4. Now the up-or-out contract becomes less attractive when
the probational period is shorter, or teaching and research activities are less
complementary. What is the reason for this sharp contrast?
Compared to ev; the equilibrium bv has two remarkable characteristics. First,
as we have mentioned, parameters  and  not only have direct e¤ect on ev
in (29), but also have indirect e¤ect on ev through bx which is endogenously
determined by (23), hence directly dependent on parameters  and : Second,
 and  should not be too large to satisfy (2  )(1  ) > 2=; the condition
for this case to be true.
With these observations and referring to (18), we know that when  be-
comes larger, ceteris paribus,  will have stronger incentive to mimick : Put in
another word, for perfect screening, now the the university should correspond-
ingly increase the academic criterion, but this exacerbates s e¤ort distortion
in probational period. Since  has no rents, this distortion will be burdened
by the university in the end. This implies that up-or-out contract becomes less
attractive. By contrast, in equilibrium ev;  can not mimick ; so a slight change
of  does not increase e¤ort distortion.
Similarly, when  increases,  will have more incentive to mimick  since
C(bx) Cm = (2 )(bx  12 )2 decreases. Then perfect screening also requires the
university to increase academic criterion, which in turn exacerbates s e¤ort
distortion in probational period, and hence decreases the attractiveness of the
up-or-out tenure contract.
14
3 Extension
In above analysis, we discuss how the university should o¤er tenure contract
under the assumption that academic performance can be perfectly measured.
Two results are worthwhile mentioning again. First, the up-or-out contract
always dominates the low-wage direct tenure contract; second, the up-or-out
contract, once employed, always realizes perfect screening. In this extension, we
want to see whether these results will be changed if we introduce measurement
error for academic performance.
To this aim, now we assume that the observed academic performance of
teacher  is
q(x; ) = x + "; (30)
which depends not only on his ability  and research e¤ort x, but also on random
shock ": To simplify, we assume that " is iid in each period, following a normal
H(:) with mean 0 and not correlated with :
Except for introducing "; other model setting is the same as before. Since
both the university and candidates are risk neutral, introducing this random
shock does not change the direct tenure contracts.
Now denote the up-or-out contract in question to be

R#; wn; wt
	
: If both
 and  accept this contract, and choose x and x in probational period, then 
gets tenure position with probability
P (x;R#) = Pr(" > R#   ) = 1 H(R#   x); (31)
and  with probability
P (x;R#) = Pr(" > R#   x) = 1 H(R#   x) (32)
Because a cumulative distribution function is always nondecreasing, then for
any x and R#; there must be
P (x;R#)  P (x;R#); (33)
that is, P (x;R#) is a rst-order stochastic dominance to P (x;R#).
If  accepts contract

R#; wn; wt
	
; he will choose his e¤ort x to maximize
his expected benet:
wn   C(x) + P (x;R#)(w
t   Cm)
1   + (1 
P (x;R#))
(   c)
1   (34)
where the rst two terms represent s benets in probational period, the third
term represents his discounted present benets since after obtaining tenure po-
sition, and the fourth term represents the present value of his benet in outside
competitive market if he fails to get tenure position. The rst-order condition
for the program is
@C(x)
@x
=
@ P (x;R#)
@x
[(wt   Cm)  (   c)]
1   (35)
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Similarly, if  accepts contract

R#; wn; wt
	
;he will choose x to maximize
his expected prots
wn   C(x) + P (x;R#)(w
t   Cm)
1   + (1  P (x;R
#))
(   c)
1   ; (36)
and the corresponding rst order condition is
@C(x)
@x
=
@P (x;R#)
@x
[(wt   Cm)  (   c)]
1   (37)
Denote the results of the two programs above to be x# and x#; and P 
and P#: Note that, under the normal distribution assumption, P# and P# are
strictly positive. Now we characterize the conditions for the contract

R#; wn; wt
	
:
s ex ante participation constraint is
wn   C(x#) + P# (w
t   Cm    + c)
1   
   c: (38)
s ex ante participation constraint is
wn   C(x#) + P# (w
t   Cm    + c)
1       c: (39)
s interior participation constraint is
wt   Cm     c: (40)
Clearly, if possible,  will necessarily accept the tenure o¤er.
Lemma 1 x# > 1=2: That is,  will distort upwards the research e¤ort in
probational period.
Proof. Let us see the rst-order condition (37). By assumption of the normal
distribution, @P (x;R
#)
@x > 0 for any R
# and x: However, from s interior par-
ticipation constraint (40), we have wt   Cm >    c: So, the right side of (37)
must be positive. Recall that C
0
(x)<>0 if x
>
<
1
2 : There must be x
# > 1=2:
Proposition 6 Assume " follows a normal distribution with mean zero and
variance 2 < 1: If v is very small, then the low-wage direct tenure contract
dominates up-or-out contract.
This proposition is a direct corollary of the above lemma. As it is clear,
given that the measurement error follows a normal distribution with mean zero
and nite variance,  facing the up-or-out tenure contract will distort upwards
his research e¤ort in probational period for a larger promotion probability. For
the tenure wage wt satisfying s interior participation constraint (40) is very
attractive. However, when v is very small, i.e., when the candidate is most
likely to be ; this distortion e¤ect from the up-or-out contract will dominate
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its benet from avoiding vocational vacancy. By contrast, in this case, the low-
wage direct tenure contract results in no distortion of  although the university
may indeed su¤er from vocational vacancy when the candidate proves to be :
But as it is assumed, this expected loss is very small when v is very small.
Denition 1 The up-or-out contract

R#; wn; wt
	
implements e¤ective screen-
ing in the sense of probability if it leads to P#  P#.
Here we say it is an e¢ cient screening in the sense of probability because
once employed  will have a positive probability to get the tenure position. This
is a very important di¤erence with the perfect screening case, which, of course,
can be seen as a special case with zero measurement error.
Proposition 7 Assume " follows a normal distribution with mean zero and
variance 2: If 2 ! 1; the up-or-out contract R#; wn; wt	 characterized
above implements e¤ective screening in the sense of probability. Furthermore, it
realizes the rst-best outcome unless there is a binding minimum-wage restric-
tion.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary contract

R#; wn; wt
	
: s promotion probability
is P (x;R#) =
R1
R# x
1p
2
e 
"2
22 d": So, @P (x;R
#)
@x ! 0 when 2 ! 1. Then
the rst order conditions (35) and (37) immediately imply that both types
will choose socially optimal e¤ort allocation, i.e., x# ! 1=2 and x# ! 1=2;
which, by the rst-order stochastic dominance, in turn, imply P# > P#; the
e¤ective screening in the sense of probability. Then, combining two participation
constraints (38) and (39) taking equality, we get
( P#   P#)(w
t   Cm    + c)
1   = (
   )

1 + P#

1  

(41)
where all terms are independent on wn: Note that the right side of (41) is
positive, and P#   P# > 0; then there must exist a unique wt such that (41)
holds. Note further that s interior participation constraint is strictly satised,
i.e., wt   Cm >    c: Finally, substituting the wt determined in (41) back to
(38) or (39), we can get the unique corresponding wn:
At rst glance, this proposition seems astonishing since it implies that ex-
treme measurement error will improve e¢ ciency. However, this is reasonable.
If measurement error of academic performance tends to innity, the benet of
the candidate by distorting research e¤ort in probational period tends to zero
since it will not increase his probability of being promotion to tenure position.
So no e¤ort distortion arises. Insofar as s interior participation constraint
is strictly satised, the university actually "rewards" the tenured professors.
Because  has less valuable outside option, his actual reward, if promoted to
tenure position, is larger. However, with same e¤ort x, P (x;R#) < P (x;R#);
so  is also less likely to be promoted. Adjusted by opportunity cost and pro-
motion probability, the ex ante expected reward for both types is the same.
As no term in (41) depends on wn, the university can then choose a low wn
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to "punish" the candidate in the probational period taking away all the rents
if there is no minimum wage restriction. In this sense, minimum wage policy
may decrease the attractiveness of up-or-out contract to the university. Put in
another word, given the university o¤ers an up-or-out contract, the minimum
wage policy probably restricts the freedom of its rent-extraction, and hence pro-
tecting the teachers. This implication is consistent to Freemans (1977) analysis
on minimum wage policy as a insurance mechanism to professors under tenure
system.
4 Concluding Remarks
The university can be seen as an economic organization that produces and sells
knowledge. Consequentially, the professors produce knowledge by researching
activity while instructing knowledge by teaching activity. In long term, research
and teaching activities are equally important for the university. Therefore, both
need to be incentivized. However, designing a multi-task incentive contract has
essential di¢ culty when one task, teaching activity in this paper, is immeasur-
able. In this case, by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), the only way to incentive
teaching activity is to decrease the incentive power to the measurable research-
ing activity. As such, we justify the low-powered contract for tenure professors
from the multi-task perspective.
However, multi-tasking is not the only problem facing the university. It also
want to select able employees while extracting the informational rents. For this
aim, the low-powered contract performs badly. Typically, when the candidates
have their abilities as private information, the university faces a dilemma by
using a direct tenure contract, either transferring informational rents to the
candidate with low ability, or su¤ering from vocational vacancy. This paper
shows that an up-or-out tenure contract may be a solution to this dilemma.
Finally, we think that the tenure system is a very complicated institution.
Perhaps no single insight is enough for its justication. In this sense, our expla-
nation is complementary to the existing literature on academic tenure system.
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